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Abstract
Aviation is a safety focused industry that intends to continually improve safety. Many safety
models have been created, but right now the most prominent model is the International Civil
Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Safety Management System (SMS). It has four components:
safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. NASA’s
nationwide reporting system, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incorporates these
four components, as does the program created by Western Michigan University’s College of
Aviation. Termed the Collegiate Aviation Safety Reporting System (CASRS), it was created to
bring NASA’s program to a local scale. This paper examines international safety systems and the
relationship between ASRS, CASRS, and SMS. It uses specific data from reports and first-hand
experience with CASRS and the College of Aviation safety committee to assess the system’s
effectiveness and make recommendations for its improvement. Overall, CASRS was found to be
an effective system, but specific recommendations have been made to the College of Aviation
regarding ways the system can be improved to ensure its continued success.
Keywords: Safety Management System, confidential incident reporting, just culture,
Aviation Safety Reporting System, Western Michigan University, College of Aviation
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Introduction
Aviation is a crucial industry in today’s global economy. It is an industry that prides itself
on safety, and there are many tested and proven safety models. ICAO’s Safety Management
System is designed to accomplish the goal of improving safety through four pillars.
The FAA created a joint program with NASA to confidentially collect safety reports from
aviation professionals, with the idea that these reports and the data in them can be used to create
policies that will make us safer. Western Michigan University’s College of Aviation (CoA)
followed suit in 2006 and created the Collegiate Aviation Safety Reporting System (CASRS).
Alongside the CoA Safety Committee, CASRS is at the heart of the college’s safety policy. It
allows for anonymous reporting and accomplishes most of the goals of a safety management
system.
Upon comparison of SMS programs and NASA’s ASRS, it is clear that CASRS was
effectively designed. Specific data also proves that CASRS has been effective and has helped
reduce repeat safety incidents at the College of Aviation. However, data shows that the number
of CASRS reports is not consistently trending with yearly changes in number of flight hours or
the number of safety-sensitive students. This suggests CASRS is not as widely utilized as it
should be, a critical factor in a system that relies on self-reporting to be successful.
CASRS could become more effective if awareness about the system was raised and if
more people knew that reports are non-punitive. Regardless, while improvements continue to be
made, the system overall is quite effective.
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Western Michigan University’s College of Aviation
College of Aviation Overview
Pilot training is one of the largest sectors of general aviation operations. Western
Michigan University’s College of Aviation is home to one of the largest collegiate aviation
training programs in the country. Located at the W.K. Kellogg Regional Airport in Battle Creek,
MI, the College of Aviation’s operation includes a fleet of 40 aircraft, including the Cirrus SR-20
and Piper Seminole (College of Aviation, 2019).
The College of Aviation is one of Western Michigan University’s nine academic colleges
(Western Michigan University, 2019). It offers three undergraduate degree programs, including
Aviation Flight Science, Aviation Management and Operations, and Aviation Technical
Operations. Aviation Flight Science is the program that prepares students for a career as a
professional pilot. The engine test cells and laboratories, maintained for Technical Operations
students, also come with their own unique risks. Safety oversight is critical for this college.
Students can enter the program with no flight experience and leave 4 years later with a
job offer and training date as a pilot with an airline, corporate flight department, or the military.
Therefore, it follows that a uniquely high risk level is associated with a collegiate training
operation that allows for low-time flight instructors to teach other low-time pilots in a congested
airspace full of relatively inexperienced pilots.
Due to a strong safety culture, WMU has never had a fatal accident in the 80 years since
flight training began in 1939. This is an accomplishment to be proud of. WMU has averaged
19,389.6 flight hours per year since 2007 (College of Aviation, 2007-2018).
The College of Aviation’s official website states the following about aviation safety: “At
the College of Aviation, safety is not just a rhetorical exercise. Safety is a practical exercise in
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risk identification, measurement, and mitigation. The focus on safety is broad and extends from
the classroom, to the laboratory, to the flight line, to the skies above them all. The culture of
safety impacts everyone at the college. Safety is at the core of what we do. The equipment and
training tools used by the college, and the manner that individuals utilize the equipment,
demonstrates the College of Aviation’s commitment to safety” (College of Aviation, 2019).
An impeccable safety record is significant. The College of Aviation’s goal is to have their
safety record continue. In an environment like theirs, systems to aid in hazard identification and
risk mitigation have been put in place to accomplish this goal.
Safety Management Systems
Safety Management System Overview
The term Safety Management System is a broad term that describes ICAO’s approach to
managing safety policies. SMS often encompasses the entirety of a company’s safety policies
and procedures. It is defined by the FAA as “the formal, top-down, organization-wide approach
to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes
systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk.” (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2016).
SMS is a multi-faceted and holistic approach to aviation safety that is becoming standard
throughout the industry. The FAA and ICAO consider it to be a reasonable next step in the
evolution of aviation safety. The FAA website notes that SMS for service providers will
integrate modern safety risk management and safety assurance concepts into repeatable,
proactive systems (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016). It also points out the various benefits
that SMS provides: a structured means of safety risk management decision making, a means of
demonstrating safety management capability before system failures occur, increased confidence
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in risk controls through structured safety assurance processes, an effective interface for
knowledge sharing between regulator and certificate holder, and a safety promotion framework
to support a sound safety culture (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016).
SMS has four components: safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and
safety promotion (Chakib, 2018). Safety policy establishes senior management’s commitment to
safety performance and establishes clear safety objectives. Safety risk management determines
the need for new or revised risk controls based on the assessment of acceptable risk. Safety
assurance evaluates the continued effectiveness of implemented risk control strategies and assists
in identifying new hazards. Finally, safety promotion involves training, communication, and
other actions to create a positive safety culture in the company (Federal Aviation Administration,
September 11, 2017). The whole purpose of SMS is to provide a systematic way of achieving
acceptable levels of safety risk, and these components all come together to make up safety
culture. Often intangible, this safety culture is a crucial part of SMS.
Establishing the Need for SMS
It is not difficult to understand the risks associated with aviation; this highlights the
importance of risk identification and mitigation. However, identifying every risk, whether related
to the flight crew, the aircraft, or weather, can be difficult. Providing a consistent and organized
company-wide method of reacting to and mitigating those risks is also challenging.
It would likely be a large task for all departments such as flight operations, maintenance,
dispatch/scheduling, line services, etc. to attempt to mitigate their own risks without a companywide, unified framework. It would be almost as if each department has a similar goal, but each
with an entirely different way of attempting to accomplish that goal. Communication suffers
without a unified framework.
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When it comes to safety, everyone benefits with open lines of communication to allow
the sharing of ideas and the sharing of various issues and corrective actions. It is this need for a
unified approach to safety in a company or industry that is solved with the implementation of
SMS.
Safety Culture
A safety culture exists when everyone at an institution acts conscientiously to work to
improve safety. A positive safety culture will be ingrained into the mind of each member of the
organization, leading them to make every decision through the lens of safety. A positive safety
culture can have impacts as seemingly obvious as ensuring that all gates are consistently closed,
or major impacts such as double-checking that an aircraft has been appropriately returned to
service after an inspection. There is no such thing as “too safe” in aviation.
SMS is a critical part of establishing a positive safety culture, as its four components
work to embed the safety culture into the organization’s framework. Safety culture can often be
the difference between success and failure as an organization. The infamous Chernobyl accident
was the first in which a failed safety culture was cited as a contributing factor (Robertson, 2018).
If a safety culture is so critical to the success of an organization, then how can one be
established? A 2018 study by Michael F. Robertson found that in collegiate flight schools, there
is a positive relationship between SMS implementation and safety culture, safety promotion, and
management commitment to safety (Robertson, 2018). Through surveys of 453 individuals from
13 schools, data was gathered to prove the correlation. The study also found a positive link
between safety promotion and safety culture (Robertson, 2018), indicating that the more that
management promotes safety, the stronger the safety culture will be. Additionally, the study
found a significant and positive relationship between the Chief Flight Instructor/Supervisor of
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Flight and safety culture; it showed that if there is more management commitment to the
implementation of the SMS, then interactions with the Chief Flight Instructor tended to be
perceived as more positive (Robertson, 2018). This clearly documents the positive link between
implementation of an SMS and the establishment of a positive safety culture within the
organization.
Through a 2016 PhD dissertation, Embry Riddle’s Kevin O’Leary further examined the
relationship and effects of safety culture and ethical leadership on safety performance. Ethical
leadership means “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal
actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through
two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making” (O’Leary, 2016). It was
determined that there is a strong and significant relationship between safety culture and ethical
leadership. Though focused specifically on fractional pilots, the report references a 1986 study
that showed a link between pilot attitudes towards safety and overall safety performance
(O’Leary, 2016). This supports the hypothesis that organizational climate has a significant
impact on safety climate. In turn, safety climate influences self-reported safety compliance, and
safety climate is a predictor of safety performance (O’Leary, 2016).
Both reports emphatically prove the same point: it starts at the top. Safety promotion and
SMS implementation have been proven to be positively related to establishing a positive safety
culture, which has been proven to be positively related to safety performance. These reports
found that management influences safety culture, and that if management acts appropriately and
ethically to implement an SMS and promote safety, a positive safety culture/climate and in turn
positive safety performance will follow.
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NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
History and Purpose
The desire to collect and disseminate aviation incident data is nothing new. In 1958,
United Airlines President William A. Patterson commented on the need to develop accurate
safety trend information. A few years later, in 1966, Bobbie R. Allen, director of the Bureau of
Safety of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, commented that “it might be profitable if we
explored a system of incident reporting which would assure a substantial flow of vital
information to the computer for processing, and at the same time, would provide some method
designed to effectively eliminate the personal aspect of the individual occurrences so that the
information derived would be helpful to all and harmful to none” (Billings, Cheaney, Hardy, &
Reynard, 1986).
In December 1974, TWA flight 514 crashed in Virginia amidst confusion between the
crew and ATC, after the crew misinterpreted an approach plate. The NTSB investigation found
that six weeks before, a United Airlines crew almost made the same mistake (Billings, Cheaney,
Hardy, & Reynard, 1986).
In January 1974, United Airlines created an internal reporting system named the “Flight
Safety Awareness Program.” The pilots from the United flight informed the company, which
then told other pilots and the FAA. This event marked the formal beginnings of a system that
was decades in the making (Billings, Cheaney, Hardy, & Reynard, 1986).
In May 1975, the FAA issued Advisory Circular 00-46, formally announcing a
confidential, non-punitive incident reporting program. It was called the Aviation Safety
Reporting Program (ASRP), but it would later be re-named the Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS). Its purpose would be “to encourage the reporting and identification of
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deficiencies and discrepancies in the system before they cause accidents or incidents” (Federal
Aviation Administration, 1975) In August 1975, it was announced that NASA would serve as a
third-party to review and analyze the data. The FAA understood that the success of the program
depended on the free and unrestricted flow of confidential information.
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Overview
Since its creation in 1975, ASRS has served one purpose: to review, process, and analyze
voluntary submissions from aviation professionals and disseminate that information to
stakeholders (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2018). It is intended to improve
the industry by providing a place for the free exchange of information related to aviation safety.
The FAA and NASA understood that everyone benefits from open communication, so they set
out to create a system where aviation professionals can voluntarily report safety related incidents
under a set of guidelines, with immunity guaranteed if protocol is followed.
The idea is that the reports will be received, de-identified, analyzed, and disseminated to
the industry as a whole so that each member of the industry may learn from the mistakes of
others. The idea is that if one incident happens, like United’s near miss into Dulles, the entire
industry can become safer as a result of the reporting of the incident and the sharing of the data
so that other professionals may learn from previous mistakes and avoid the same situation
themselves.
The FAA has various tools to use against certified aviation professionals or certified
companies. Among them is enforcement action which can result in a letter in a file for two years.
They can also pursue certificate action, which can include the suspension or revocation of a
certificate. For a pilot, the suspension or revocation of a certificate can be career ending,
depending on the gravity of the offense and violation committed.
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Under the ASRS program, individuals who submit what has come to be known as “a
NASA form” are eligible for immunity from FAA enforcement or certificate action, provided
they meet the program specifications. Advisory Circular 00-46, which created the program,
included specific details. AC 00-46E, the current version of the document, states the following:
The FAA considers the filing of a report with NASA concerning an incident or
occurrence involving a violation of 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII or the 14 CFR to be indicative
of a constructive attitude. Such an attitude will tend to prevent future violations.
Accordingly, although a finding of violation may be made, neither a civil penalty nor
certificate suspension will be imposed if:
1. The violation was inadvertent and not deliberate;
2. The violation did not involve a criminal offense, accident, or action under
49 U.S.C. §44709, which discloses a lack of qualification or competency,
which is wholly excluded from this policy;
3. The person has not been found in any prior FAA enforcement action to
have committed a violation of 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII, or any regulation
promulgated there for a period of 5 years prior to the date of occurrence;
and
4. The person proves that, within 10 days after the violation, or date when
the person became aware or should have been aware of the violation, he or
she completed and delivered or mailed a written report of the incident or
occurrence to NASA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011).
Essentially, the individual is eligible for immunity if the violation was not intentional, if
it was not a criminal offense or aircraft accident, if the individual has not been the subject of
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FAA enforcement action within the previous 5 years, and if the report is submitted within 10
days of the violation or within 10 days of when the individual would have become aware of the
violation.
Confidentiality clause
The FAA attempted to create a program similar to ASRS in the 1960s, but it never gained
traction because most people lacked confidence in the promised immunity (Billings, Cheaney,
Hardy, & Reynard, 1986). Former Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) President Clarence Sayen
was quoted as early as 1954 cautioning all airlines that, “incident reporting systems aren’t
working because pilots fear disciplinary action by the carriers or the government if they reflect
dangerous occurrences” (Billings, Cheaney, Hardy, & Reynard, 1986). On the second attempt in
1975, the FAA got it right. There is no shortage of documents governing ASRS and its
confidentiality clause; the FAA and NASA wanted there to be no doubt that they were taking
confidentiality and immunity seriously.
FAR §91.25 states the following: “The Administrator of the FAA will not use reports
submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Aviation Safety
Reporting Program (or information derived therefrom) in any enforcement action except
information concerning accidents or criminal offenses which are wholly excluded from the
program” (14 C.F.R. §91.25, 2019).
FAA Order JO 7200.20, governing ATC professionals, states, “The Air Traffic
Organization will not use either the written report or the content of a written report to initiate or
support any disciplinary action, unless the reported event meets the exclusionary criteria”
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2012). AC 00-46E says, “the NASA ASRS security system
ensures the confidentiality and anonymity of the reporter, and other parties as appropriate,
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involved in a reported occurrence or incident. The FAA will not seek, and NASA will not release
or make available to the FAA, any report filed with NASA under the ASRS or any other
information that might reveal the identity of any party involved in an occurrence or incident
reported under the ASRS” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011).
AC 00-46E explains that there has not been a single breach of confidentiality in more
than 34 years of ASRS under NASA management (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011).
Furthermore, NASA’s ASRS website section about confidentiality and incentives to report
indicates that more than one million reports have been submitted, and to date no reporter’s
identity has ever been breached (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2019). All
reports are de-identified and generalized prior to being entered into the database. This system is
working, largely due to the FAA learning from history and placing a high priority on
confidentiality, leading people to feel comfortable submitting reports without a fear of
retribution.
ASRS Relationship with Safety Management Systems
ASRS is an excellent example of a component of SMS. SMS is the newest trend in
aviation safety, representing an industry-wide approach to safety management. If a standard SMS
is top-down and starts with senior leadership, ASRS fits in perfectly. The FAA is the top of
aviation regulation and safety in the United States. The FAA and NASA created this system, and
in doing so set a perfect example for the industry and the world. From the top down in this
country, safety is on the forefront.
Safety Policy
In addition to incorporating a top-down approach to safety like SMS, ASRS shares many
of the main components of SMS. It mirrors safety policy closely; safety policy is about
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establishing senior management’s commitment to continually improving safety. With the FAA
creating this program to collect, analyze, and disseminate data related to aviation safety, ASRS
clearly embodies SMS by demonstrating the FAA’s commitment to continually improving
safety.
Safety Risk Management
Additionally, ASRS includes elements of safety risk management. Risk management
involves assessing, controlling, and analyzing the risk. With each report submitted (over 1.5
million so far (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2018)), a specific process helps
analyze the report. NASA has various alerting procedures that can be followed if the report is
critical. They can use an alert message to inform controlling agencies immediately of items such
as a defective navigation-aid, confusing procedures, or an aircraft system anomaly. To date,
ASRS has sent 6,322 alert messages (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2018). In
addition, they can issue a quick response to quickly analyze and issue operational guidance to
entities like the FAA, DOT, NTSB, NASA, and the U.S. Congress (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 2018).
Safety Assurance
Another component of SMS is safety assurance, which identifies new hazards and risks.
With ASRS set up to receive reports from all over the country about any safety related topic,
from inoperative navigation-aids to improper control methods or instructions, ASRS is
continually identifying and helping mitigate new risks. Proof of that can be found in its origins as
it relates to the United near-miss and eventual TWA accident.
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Safety Promotion
Finally, ASRS contains elements of safety promotion, the final component of SMS.
Safety promotion focuses heavily on disseminating lessons learned and sharing experiences with
colleagues and other professionals in the industry. ASRS understands that the industry is safer
when everyone is informed of safety issues and operational issues. Several components of ASRS
are specifically designed to help share information and promote safety. A monthly newsletter
named Callback includes snippets from reports with supporting commentary and lessons learned
(Yodice, 2012). Callback is sent to subscribers and contains valuable information to prevent
similar situations from occurring again. In 2017, there were over 29,000 subscribers (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2018). Along with the newsletter, NASA has made the
de-identified information in the ASRS database available. Individuals can search the database for
specific reports based on a number of criteria. NASA can then search its database and send
relevant reports to the individual requesting them (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 2018).
It has been proven that an SMS is a beneficial addition to safety policy in the United
States. While ASRS is not specifically a component of an SMS, it is explicitly clear that all four
elements of SMS are embedded into ASRS. This makes it an incredibly valuable tool to the
aviation industry. If ASRS works on a national scale, its processes can be applied in other areas
as well; it has applications to other industries such as the medical industry, and it even has
applications to internal aviation operators such as individual airlines or collegiate flight schools.
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Western Michigan University’s Collegiate Aviation Safety Reporting System
Purpose and Overview
The overall efficacy and positive impact to safety on a national level which results from
ASRS is astounding. Aviation is all about learning from mistakes, accidents, and incidents;
ASRS is no exception. The benefit of having a system in which individuals can safely report and
raise awareness for safety issues, which in turn can be used to make others safer, is almost
intangible. In light of the effects that both SMS and ASRS have on safety culture and the overall
level of safety, many entities have created internal reporting systems which mirror ASRS, simply
on a smaller scale.
At Western Michigan University’s College of Aviation, that internal reporting system is
called CASRS – the Collegiate Aviation Safety Reporting System. CASRS was created in 2006.
While the CoA does not have a formal SMS, it operates CASRS to this day. The system was
created as a model of ASRS, and CASRS fully represents the top-down approach to safety that is
so clearly identified in SMS. Just as ASRS has a strong relationship with SMS, CASRS does too.
It is simply ASRS on a college-wide scale instead of a national scale.
CASRS shares the same qualities and benefits to safety as ASRS and SMS. It has specific
applications to the four components of an SMS: safety policy, safety assurance, safety risk
management, and safety promotion. While the efficacy of SMS programs and ASRS is clear, no
such study has yet been completed on the efficacy of CASRS at WMU’s College of Aviation.
How CASRS Works
CASRS was created in 2006 by a CoA employee. He still maintains it to this day on an
as-needed basis, despite having a full-time job. With an extensive IT background, he worked to
set up the system to allow it to do everything that was desired by college leadership. It provides
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an interface that allows authorized users to receive, analyze, sort, and code reports. CASRS is
designed to receive reports from people around the college, including students, faculty, staff, and
flight instructors. Reports are intended to be about anything that can impact safety. In the past,
topics have included more than just flight operations. CASRS has received reports of people
slipping in icy parking lots, chemical spills in maintenance labs, and even reports of doors at the
secure airport facility being stuck open due to snow drifts. Flight operations certainly contribute
to most of the CASRS reports, but it is not the exclusive focus of the system.
Once a report is submitted, it is stored indefinitely. Each report gives college leadership
and the safety committee a chance to assess the impact to safety and, if necessary, recommend
policy changes to prevent a recurrence. This falls right in line with the aviation industry’s long
history of learning from mistakes; indeed, it falls right in line with the origins of ASRS, dating
back to TWA flight 514.
When a report is submitted, an email is automatically generated and sent to several
employees. This list reinforces the idea that CASRS helps drive a top-down approach to safety.
The list includes the executive director of flight operations/director of safety, associate dean,
chief flight instructor/director of flight operations, associate director of flight operations,
program manager and director of standards, faculty chair, director of maintenance, manager of
line services, manager of dispatch and scheduling, manager of the Battle Creek Air Traffic
Control Tower, and both administrative assistants that help facilitate the system. This email helps
those individuals quickly determine the level of risk and whether immediate action is warranted.
College of Aviation Safety Committee
The College of Aviation has created a safety committee to oversee the CASRS system
and facilitate analysis of each report. It meets on a biweekly basis to discuss each report that has
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been submitted since the last meeting. The committee is made up of the list of individuals
identified previously, in addition to student representatives, faculty members, flight instructors, a
representative from WMU’s main campus OSHA team, and the airport operations manager.
While the College of Aviation still does not have a formal FAA-approved SMS, it does
have many of the crucial components. A report discussing a safety management model for FAR
141 approved flight schools explicitly identifies a safety committee as part of that model (Carney
& Mendonca, 2017). The report specifically discusses safety policy, internal investigations, risk
assessment, hazard identification, safety training and education, and safety communication, all of
which are crucial components to the CASRS system and the safety committee (Carney &
Mendonca, 2017).
When a report is submitted, it is assigned to two members of the committee. Each
member is responsible for reviewing the report, discussing it with the individuals involved (if
possible, as reports may be submitted anonymously), and then voting on it. The committee
member is tasked with assigning a risk level to each report (green, yellow, or red), and assigning
up to two causal factors. Some examples of causal factors include inadvertent disregard for
policy or procedure, misapplication of flight controls, experience level, bird strike, or air traffic
congestion. There are 46 causal factors that can be assigned to a report (CASRS, 2006-2019).
Each reviewer shall vote on the report individually. If both reviewers agree the first time,
the report will be closed at the meeting. If their votes disagree, they have a second chance to
review. If both reviewers do not agree on the causal factors and risk level after the second
review, the report will be sent to the full committee for discussion.
After a report has been given a risk level and causal factors, the system codes it
accordingly. It allows users to view various graphs that help visualize trends in reports. The idea
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is to help determine when a pattern of reports for a particular causal factor is forming. For
example, if six reports for magnetos being left on come in over a few weeks, then college
leadership and the safety committee is able to see this and react appropriately.
Each report is designed to help make the environment safer at the College of Aviation. As
such, there is follow up with each report. If the committee deems necessary, reports can be used
to institute new policies aimed at reducing the frequency of such reports or preventing them from
happening again. This is another component of CASRS that mirrors ASRS. A 1986 document
discussing the development of ASRS talks about using ASRS data to determine trends. It says,
“trend analysis remains an important goal of the ASRS group, and research in this area continues
to be pursued aggressively” (Billings, Cheaney, Hardy, & Reynard, 1986). The extensive
database of reports is vital to the success of CASRS, because it allows leadership and committee
members to use the data and trends to create policies to make the college safer.
In addition to providing a forum in which safety reports can be discussed, the safety
committee provides a place for the leaders of each department, as well as students and part-time
staff, to be together for discussion. Discussion at these meetings is not always limited to safety
reports; there have been specific instances in which the committee was used as a forum for
discussion on topics not related to safety reports.
For instance, at one meeting, a discussion started that led to the resolution of
miscommunication between management and flight instructors. One member brought up a post
in the WMU CFI Facebook page that was asking if any CFI had a list of the airplanes with
“good” landing lights. Maintenance was concerned to hear this. The committee learned that
WMU maintenance had been testing different landing lights in the SR-20, and that instructors
were noticing one to be so dim it was hard to see lines at night. The other landing light was said
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to be sufficiently bright. Maintenance was previously unaware of the large discrepancy, because
it is the instructors and students who fly the aircraft in all of the varying weather conditions and
situations. Through discussion at the safety committee, maintenance was briefed on a previously
unknown issue, and they were able to fix it proactively, before a report was ever submitted due
to an unsafe situation stemming from a dim landing light.
Confidential Incident Reporting
Just as ASRS is confidential, the CASRS system allows for anonymity as well.
Individuals submitting reports have the opportunity to identify themselves, which is encouraged.
This allows the committee and leadership to counsel individuals involved in order to prevent
occurrences from happening again. After all, WMU is a training environment where people
come to learn; mistakes are inevitable. However, it is crucial to note that the CASRS system is
explicitly non-punitive and does allow users to submit reports anonymously.
ASRS maintains a non-punitive system as well, provided that the report was not
disqualified by factors previously discussed, including a crime or intentional violation. CASRS
operates the same way. If the report does not describe intentional violations or occurrences, no
one will be punished for their mistakes. The option to submit anonymously is important to the
CASRS system. The fear of punishment can easily lead some people to not file reports, which
hurts the system and its effectiveness. In aviation, everyone wins with the free flow of
information related to safety incidents, so not having a report submitted hurts the college’s
ability to improve safety. An un-dated NASA report regarding confidential incident reporting
states that “people are generally willing to share their knowledge if they are assured their
identities will remain confidential, and ultimately, anonymous and the information they provide

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CASRS

22

will be protected from disciplinary and legal consequences” (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, n.d.).
CASRS builds on this very principle in order to encourage the submission of more
reports. Minutes are sent out to students every two weeks containing information about each
report, but they are heavily de-identified to ensure that no single report can be tied back to an
individual. This confidential option of CASRS is undoubtedly one of its most important features,
because sometimes the most important reports in terms of making changes to safety policy are
the ones that people are afraid to submit because of how serious the results could be.
Just Reporting Culture
In terms of incident reporting, the ability to submit anonymously is important. However,
perhaps even more important is the presence of a just culture. A just culture is one in which all
employees are encouraged to provide, and feel comfortable providing, safety-related information
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2016). It is an environment in which employees know
they will be treated fairly based on their actions, and not be punished for self-reporting mistakes.
It is crucial to incident reporting because the fear of retribution leads people to withhold reports.
ICAO notes that a strong just culture is perceived as the basis for a successful safety culture
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2016). Even more important than being able to
submit anonymously is not feeling like you have to submit anonymously. The benefits of a just
culture include increased reporting, more effective safety management, and building trust
between front-line employees and managers (Global Aviation Information Network, 2004).
WMU has worked hard to maintain its just culture, which helps CASRS be successful.

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CASRS

23

Assessing the Effectiveness of CASRS
Overall
In order to assess the effectiveness of a program like CASRS, the assessment needs to
include both a holistic view of the program and specific data points. The holistic view can be
used to determine if the system was set up and designed properly, and if it appropriately
accomplishes its goals. The specific data points can be used to confirm or deny that previous
hypothesis.
CASRS was designed to mirror its national counterpart, ASRS. It does so excellently.
The ASRS database has two functions, the first of which is to notify the FAA and the aviation
industry of hazards in the system. The second is to explain why the hazard exists (Reynard, n.d.).
CASRS follows the same philosophy; it serves to inform college leadership and the population of
various hazards or occurrences that WMU crews are experiencing, and it provides a forum to
figure out why that hazard exists. If it can be determined why a hazard exists, it can be
determined how to mitigate or even eliminate that risk.
CASRS is a top-down approach to safety management and falls in line with each
component of SMS, especially risk management and safety promotion. The program itself has
intangible benefits which lead to the conclusion that it is effective. It openly supports a just
culture in the College of Aviation. Flight instructors and flight students serve on the committee
in roles called “peer advocates.” The purpose of their presence is to represent students and
instructors. This gives comfort to the outside students and CFIs, because most of the reports
submitted come from those two groups. They can rest easy knowing that they have people in the
safety committee who share their same interests and serve to ensure that no one is punished for
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their actions. This thought also comes from the top-down, as management is clear that the system
is non-punitive.
Every two weeks, the minutes of the safety committee are sent in an email to all students.
This email encourages the students to log into the system to view the minutes. The opportunity
for students to read the reports mirrors NASA’s Callback publication, and it is a large component
of safety promotion. This ensures that all students, or at least the ones who read their emails,
have the ability to learn from the reports and remain informed about the committee’s work.
A 1995 report titled Measuring Safety with Flight Data talks about database mining and
lists three specific features that are important to facilitate proper database mining. They are: easy
access to data, extensive data visualization, and vast statistical capabilities (Chappell, 1995).
CASRS, in a way, checks all three boxes.
The system features a tab on the website that says “Management.” Users with permission
simply click that link, and it takes them to a page that allows the data to be easily viewed. It has a
link to view all reports, which will show information about each report since 2006.
Additionally, it has a tab labeled “Analyze Data.” Clicking on this link takes users to a
page that allows them to view all reports in the last 52 weeks by event type/causal factor. It puts
out a graph that has the week on one axis and the event type/causal factor on the other. If a report
was filed 37 weeks ago for event type “bird strike,” there would be a black 1 in that box. If
multiple reports with the same factor or event type were filed in the same week, it will show the
number of reports. If there were three or more reports, the color becomes red to draw attention.
The safety committee uses these graphs at the end of each meeting to look for clusters of similar
reports, and determine if certain events are becoming frequent enough that they require
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intervention. It is an excellent way to analyze the data visually, the second feature noted in the
1995 report.

(CASRS, 2006-2019).
The final feature noted in the report was vast statistical capabilities. It may not be entirely
accurate to claim that CASRS has “vast” statistical capabilities, but it does nonetheless have
statistical capabilities. The system allows users to search for specific reports by criteria. A search
can be generated for all reports from a specific date range, broken down by event type. For
example, a search from 2006 to 2019 with events coded as “aircraft damage – intent for flight”
returns 23 reports (CASRS, 2006-2019). The system then allows the user to view the associated
details for each report. It also shows statistics for how many reports in the last 52 weeks have
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been coded for each particular causal factor or event type. Again, these may not be vast statistical
capabilities, but they certainly are useful.
Additionally, CASRS does an excellent job of formalizing the top-down approach to
safety which is so important to SMS and safety policy. The head of the safety committee is the
executive director of flight operations/director of safety. This is the person responsible for
overseeing all aspects of the day-to-day operations of the College of Aviation. Reporting directly
to the dean, the director of safety is one of the most influential positions at the college. Much of
the rest of the committee is made up of department heads from other entities at the college:
dispatch/scheduling, flight operations leadership, academic leadership, maintenance, and more.
The committee brings together the leaders of various departments, all there for the same reason:
to make the college safer. This system and the bi-weekly committee meetings formalize the idea
that safety is a priority, especially with top leadership.
Specific Data
Over the last few years, the safety committee has not hesitated to change College of
Aviation policies and procedures based on report data. These actions come after it is noticed that
reports with the same causal factor or same event type are being submitted with an alarming
frequency. Some specific cases help prove the efficacy of CASRS as a safety management tool.
CAPS pins
The first instance came in November 2017. WMU’s primary trainer, the SR20, features a
component called “CAPS,” the Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System. It is a parachute that can be
activated in flight to safely bring the aircraft back to the ground following a catastrophic
situation such as a flight control malfunction, spin, or loss of engine power in terrain unsuitable
for a forced landing. WMU has never had a CAPS activation, intentionally or inadvertently.
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To allow CAPS to work, extensive testing was done, and the parachute was installed with
a ballistic rocket just behind the passenger compartment. The rocket’s purpose is to propel the
parachute far enough away from the aircraft to be effective and to aid in parachute deployment.
However, dozens of aircraft on a ramp in a training environment, each equipped with a rocket,
can be a serious threat to safety. The rockets accelerate up to more than 100MPH in the first 0.1
second (Deener, 2018), and an untethered rocket would make its way thousands of feet into the
air, posing a threat to aircraft above. Anyone on the ground would likely experience fatal injuries
if that person were in the path of the rocket.
To prevent inadvertent activation, CAPS is armed and disarmed with the placement of a
pin. It has a large red tag that says, “remove before flight,” and it locks the handle in place to
prevent activation. The system is considered to be armed if the pin is removed, because it could
be activated.
Since CASRS was created in 2006, WMU has received 44 reports of the CAPS pin being
left un-secured following the flight (CASRS, 2006-2019). The reports began increasing with
frequency in 2016 and 2017. In October 2016 alone, there were three reports, some only five
days apart (CASRS, 2006-2019). In 2017, there were seven reports (CASRS, 2006-2019). The
committee noticed the increasing frequency of the reports and took action.
On November 21, 2017, a Flight Information File (FIF) was issued. An FIF is required
reading for all faculty, staff, and students at the college. Policy dictates that an aircraft cannot be
dispatched without the student and instructor first confirming with their PIN that they have read
the FIF. This FIF included checklist revisions to address CAPS pins. Among them was the
addition of a checklist item on the “aircraft securing” section that directs pilots to re-install the
CAPS pin (College of Aviation, November 21, 2017). It was previously understood that each
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pilot had to do this, but the checklist lacked an item formally instructing pilots to do so. Since the
policy was amended in 2017, there have been just three reports of CAPS pins being left out of
place, and they were spread months apart (CASRS, 2006-2019). This shows that the steps taken
by the committee have been effective. It shows that CASRS is working.
Ballast
In addition to the CAPS pins, the safety committee took action on another issue in August
2018. A weight and balance form is completed before each flight. The pilot can use this to
calculate the aircraft’s specific center of gravity (CG). Aircraft manufacturers publish charts
showing an envelope that is acceptable; if the CG falls within that envelope, flight can be
performed. If the aircraft is not within the envelope, steps must be taken before flight, such as
moving, adding, or removing weight. Having the CG within the envelope is critical. An aircraft
outside the envelope can experience undesirable characteristics that make it difficult to control or
recover from situations such as a stall.
One of the most common times an aircraft is outside the envelope is if there are two
heavier pilots up front. This can cause it to be under the maximum allowable weight but have a
CG that is too far forward. The solution to this is often to add ballast to the baggage
compartment. Ballast is a 25-pound weight that can be used to bring the CG back into the
envelope. This is sufficient for that specific crew and configuration that required the ballast.
However, if ballast is left in the aircraft, it poses a threat to the next crew. What may have been a
flight performed within the envelope could now be pushed out of the envelope if the crew is
unaware of the presence of 25+ pounds in the baggage compartment.
At the CoA, ballast used to be stored in a corner in the flight planning area. If a crew
required ballast, they would simply take what was needed, carry it to the plane, and fly. There
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was no formal oversight of ballast, and it led to ballast repeatedly being left in the aircraft, which
again poses a threat to the crew flying the plane afterwards. In a span of six months alone in
2018, the safety committee received nine reports of ballast being left in the back of an aircraft
(CASRS, 2006-2019). Some of these were discovered only after a crew had inadvertently flown
with ballast.
The safety committee took action. At the August 21st meeting, a new policy was
implemented dictating that ballast would now be checked out at dispatch (College of Aviation,
2018). If a student needs ballast, the student asks dispatch. In exchange for something of value
such as car keys, the dispatcher will provide ballast. Concurrently, the dispatcher will place a
yellow ballast tag into the tin for that specific aircraft. The student will not receive the item of
value until ballast has been returned, and the yellow tag calls attention to the fact that ballast is in
the aircraft. This policy imposed a higher level of control and organization on the use of ballast
at the college. There have been no reports of ballast being left in an aircraft since the policy was
implemented (CASRS, 2006-2019).
Student pilot endorsements
Another instance of committee intervention came after a report described a situation in
which the Supervisor of Flying (SOF; an individual responsible for supervision of flight
activities) inadvertently let a solo student pilot practice take-offs and landings at another airport
without an endorsement. A student pilot legally requires an endorsement in his/her logbook
allowing flight to each specific airport. The SOF inadvertently did not check the student’s
logbook endorsements, and the flight was allowed to continue. It was discovered upon landing
that the student did not have the proper endorsements and thus was not legal to make the flight
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that had been conducted. The student was advised to fill out a NASA report, in addition to the
CASRS report.
The SOF is a revolving position that can be filled by dozens of people. SOF-qualified
employees range from part-time CFIs to full-time faculty. However, with so much going on at
the desk, it is understandable that an SOF could miss checking some documents for solo
students. To assist, a laminated sheet had been stored at the desk, prompting SOFs to look for
specific documents, such as a student’s pilot license, medical, pilot qualification card, and more.
Upon discussion within the committee, it was discovered that “appropriate logbook
endorsements” was missing from that checklist. This left the possibility of a repeat occurrence
open. A member of the safety committee volunteered to re-do the checklist to include
endorsements, and it now hangs at the SOF desk.
These instances and resulting safety committee actions show that the system is working.
They are specific and are in addition to the intangible benefits resulting from the committee’s
work. These examples show that if the committee sees a sharp rise in reports of the same nature
or an alarming increase in frequency, problems truly can be corrected with the appropriate
action. CASRS and the safety committee are intended to collect reports, analyze them, and
prevent them from happening again. These instances prove that the committee and CASRS are
both effectively doing just that.
Recommendations for Improvements to CASRS
It is clear both overall and statistically that CASRS is effective and successful in its
mission to promote and increase safety at the College of Aviation, but no system is without
flaws. No system is without areas that can be targeted for improvements. There are a few areas in
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which CASRS can be improved, and they can be understood after gaining first-hand experience
with the system and the committee.
Recommendations to Committee Members
While it seems simple, one way the system can be improved is with timely voting by
committee members. Safety committee meetings occur on Tuesday morning, but the reports are
assigned well in advance. An email reminder is sent a few days before each meeting. However,
at many meetings, the votes on some reports have not been submitted. In times when the
assigned member is absent, it can lead to situations where a report may be voted on and given a
risk level by the committee based on a less than ideal amount of information, such as first-hand
discussions with those involved in the report. There are some cases in which members have both
voted, but the system failed to properly code their votes, indicating a bug of some sort.
Regardless, if members are given a deadline to submit votes, such as the close of business two
days prior to the meeting, it could allow the staff members who facilitate the system to properly
code all reports prior to the meeting. This could eliminate the situation where a report is either
tabled for the next meeting or voted on with minimal information, and help identify times when a
bug is preventing votes from being submitted.
Recommendations to the College of Aviation Leadership
Flight instructor training
Many of the reports submitted to CASRS come from flight instructors. CFIs are present
on most flight events. While flying is not the only safety-sensitive activity in which the CoA is
engaged, it makes up the vast majority of reports due to the high volume of flight events. There
are fewer CFIs than active flight students, but most reports tend to come from CFIs. This is
partly because CFIs are taught how to submit CASRS reports during basic standards. However,
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the proper way to use the system is still lost on many, likely due in part to the fact that new-hire
standards can be a lot of information overload. In order to keep the CASRS system active and at
the forefront of the minds of instructors, it is recommended that each year at a CFI meeting, a
refresher course be taught over CASRS. This can be done on a yearly basis, similar to the annual
TSA training that employees must go through. Doing so would provide a supplement to the
training at basic standards but emphasize yet again the college’s dedication to safety. If more
CFIs know how to submit reports, training could increase the number submitted, having a
positive impact on safety.
Risk assessment matrix
When committee members vote on reports, they must identify a risk level. The member
uses the report’s details to code it green, yellow, or red, with red being the most severe and
indicating that immediate action must be taken. Despite the importance placed on risk level,
members are given no formal guidance during voting for which criteria could make a report
green, yellow, or red. It leaves the color up to a certain level of subjectivity and can even lead to
reports of the same event type (ex: magnetos left on) being coded as different colors. This
inconsistency is not beneficial. It is recommended that a formal risk assessment matrix, similar to
that included below, be incorporated into the system to ensure more consistent coding of reports.
Reports could be coded into the same colors based on the frequency or likelihood that the event
would happen again and the severity of the consequences resulting from the incident reported.
This matrix still has an element of subjectivity but is a step in the right direction by providing
members with some guidance while voting, which can help risk level assignment be more
consistent.

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CASRS

33

(FAA, May 2, 2017)
Flight operations manual update
CASRS is a non-punitive system which allows reports to be submitted anonymously.
CASRS is referenced and described in the WMU Flight Operations Manual (FOM) under section
2.6. It says that pilots are “expected” to report safety concerns, and does mention that they can be
submitted anonymously (College of Aviation, August 15, 2017). However, the formal
description in the FOM makes no mention of the non-punitive nature of the system. While the
WMU website does indicate “remediation without retribution,” (College of Aviation, 2019), that
is not a formal document with the same level of authority as the FOM. A just culture leads to
increased reporting and helps with trend identification. A just culture begins with an atmosphere
of trust where people are encouraged to submit safety reports, not an atmosphere where people
are afraid to submit reports for fear of retribution (Global Aviation Information Network, 2004).
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It would be beneficial to formally state the non-punitive nature of the system in the FOM,
confirming to all that CASRS is not designed to punish.
CASRS integration with required classes
CASRS was created in 2006, and the College of Aviation has grown significantly since
then, seeing steady increases in enrollment in every year since 2012 (Western Michigan
University Office of Institutional Research, 2007-2018). The number of safety sensitive students
(defined as flight science students and technical operations students) has also increased. But has
the number of CASRS reports changed along with the number of safety-sensitive students? Has
it changed with the number of flight hours flown each year? The following is a graph showing
the number of students enrolled in each program for each full year of CASRS data, 2007-2018.
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That graph shows a steady rise in students from 2012 to 2018. Next is a graph showing
the number of CASRS reports submitted each year from 2007 to 2018. It is followed by a graph
depicting the number of flight hours performed each year since 2007.

Number of CASRS Reports Submitted

Number of CASRS Reports Submitted Per Year
350

301

300

268
234

250

230
193

200

168

150

119

110

2010

2011

100

135

155

158

2014

2015

225

50
0
2007

2008

2009

2012

2013

2016

2017

2018

Year
Number of CASRS Reports Submitted

(CASRS, 2006-2019).

30,000.0

27,091.6
25,608.2

21,426.3
19,262.0

20,868.3
20,495.3
18,373.2
17,246.3
16,440.0 16,370.1
15,786.8
13,707.5

25,000.0

Flight Hours

Number of Flight Hours Per Year

20,000.0
15,000.0
10,000.0
5,000.0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Year
Flight Hours

(College of Aviation, 2007-2018).

2015

2016

2017

2018

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CASRS

36

These seem to show a solid trend, indicating that the number of CASRS reports is tied to
the number of flight hours performed. That is intuitive; it makes sense that the more the college
flies, the greater the number of reports should be submitted, because the more the college flies,
the more its members are exposed to potentially risky situations. However, comparing the
percentage or net change of each category year to year shows a bit more.

% Change in Flight Hours vs. CASRS Reports Submitted
Net Change from Previous Year (%)

60.00%

52.73%

45.57%

40.00%
19.93%
20.00%

16.52%
9.25%

14.81%

6.53%

13.58%

1.94%
0.00%
-20.00%

-0.43% -3.56%
-19.64%

-5.48%

-7.56%
-22.26% -16.33% -10.10%
-28.84%
-40.00%
-17.52%
-38.34%
-60.00%
CASRS Change

20072008

20082009

20092010

20102011

20112012

20122013

20132014

20142015

-1.79%
-16.04%

20152016

20162017

20172018

-22.26% -17.52% -38.34% -7.56% 52.73% -19.64% 14.81% 1.94% 45.57% 16.52% -16.04%

Flight Hours Change -5.48% -16.33% -10.10% -28.84% 19.93% -0.43% -3.56% 9.25%
CASRS Change

6.53% 13.58% -1.79%

Flight Hours Change

(CASRS, 2006-2019) (College of Aviation, 2007-2018)
While it is true that every year besides 2013 to 2014 saw the number of reports change in
the same direction as the number of flight hours, the change was not always on the same scale, as
could be expected. Some years, the number of flight hours dropped dramatically (ex: -19.64%
2012-2013), while the number of CASRS reports was significantly different (only -0.43%). From
2015-2016, the number of flight hours performed rose an astounding 45.57% over the previous
year, but the number of CASRS reports only grew 6.53%, much less than other years. This
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suggests that there is more to the puzzle than a simple, linear relationship between the number of
hours flown and the number of reports submitted.
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A comparison of the percent change in safety-sensitive students vs. CASRS reports
submitted shows much of the same. There were four years where the trends went in opposite
directions, as the CoA saw a decline in enrollment of safety-sensitive students, but a rise in
CASRS reports (2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2012-2013, and 2017-2018). In the 2011-2012 year,
WMU had 52.73% more safety sensitive students in the CoA. However, CASRS reports rose
only 3.82%, which does not come even close to matching the trend, especially seeing that in
other years, the number of safety sensitive students went down while reports submitted went up.
These graphs show that there is more at play than simply the number of safety-sensitive
students, or the number of flight hours flown. A system like CASRS does not work without selfreporting. It does not work without consistent and strong promotion of the system to students and
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staff. If more students know about the system, know how to use it, and know the benefits it
provides to aviation safety, they are more likely to submit a report when the time comes that it is
necessary. Therefore, it is recommended that a discussion of CASRS and a tutorial over how to
use it be included in AVS 2050: Aviation Safety.
Aviation Safety is a required course for each aviation student. This ensures that each
student who graduates from this program has an opportunity to learn about CASRS. In addition,
it is a lower level class, meaning that students have the ability to benefit from learning about
CASRS early on, perhaps before they even begin flying or taking maintenance classes that deal
with dangerous chemicals or substances.
The discussion about CASRS could be a scenario-based lesson where students are
assigned a specific scenario and tasked with submitting a report. CASRS has a trainer website
that allows students to submit a phantom report. Upon submission of the report, this test site
sends the report to a database separate from the one that stores real reports. It gives users the
ability to use a replica of the system, but without interfering with overall operations. The CASRS
(or ASRS) system would be an excellent database and source of real-life scenarios that could be
used for training (Frank, Mangold, Morrison, n.d.).
Students could submit their own report, be assigned to reports submitted by other
students, and follow through the process of reviewing and voting on a report like the safety
committee does. It would work them through the process of a CASRS report from start to finish,
greatly expanding their knowledge of the top-down approach used at WMU. Students would get
experience with the system, making them more likely to use it in a real scenario, but they would
also benefit from seeing the importance of the system and seeing how the safety committee
works. Coupled with a discussion of how CASRS fits into SMS, it could be very beneficial.
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A 2015 report examined classes involving SMS education in collegiate aviation
programs, and it found that common topic areas in those courses include risk management, safety
assurance, safety promotion, and the development and analysis of aviation safety programs
(Velazquez & Bier, 2015). As it was already shown how CASRS and ASRS include elements of
each concept, then the CASRS lesson would fit well into any one of those topics.
Report sharing
In aviation, everyone benefits from a free flow of safety-related information between
various entities in the industry. WMU is not the only collegiate flight program in the country,
and it is not the only school to operate Cirrus SR20 or Piper Seminole aircraft. Many of the
events that WMU experiences are likely experienced by other flight schools or operators of those
particular aircraft. In the interest of transparency and open communication to facilitate safety, it
is recommended that CoA leadership reach out to other schools of our stature such as ERAU,
UND, and Purdue to discuss a potential partnership to include sharing de-identified reports. If
WMU can learn from the reports and create policies to help solve them, then all indications
would point to another similar collegiate program and SR20 operator such as Purdue being able
to do the same. In open communication and when safety is involved, everyone wins if more is
known about how to keep students safe.
This sharing of databases and lessons learned could also open new solutions. Maybe
WMU has a system more effective than Purdue at reducing incidents of CAPS pins being left
out, or vice versa. Despite these schools being competitors when it comes to students, there is no
competition in safety. This would open safety systems to peer review, which some call a
professional responsibility. Many also note that peer review also provides a great opportunity for
increased quality and value as far as safety systems are concerned (Canders, 2016).
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It is also recommended that the College of Aviation leadership work with WMU
leadership to determine if there are any other departments or colleges at WMU that could benefit
from confidential incident reporting. A document published by NASA’s ASRS explores the
cross-industry applications of a confidential reporting model. It explores specifically some other
industries that could benefit from a confidential reporting system, including the medical industry
and the security industry (Connell, n.d.). This report brings up a fascinating but powerful point:
incident reporting can lead to a safer healthcare system and a safer security system. For example,
it is easy to see how the world could learn from a doctor who reports a mistake in surgery or a
security officer who reports how a security procedure was circumvented and what the solution
was. The system could also have applications to programs like Chemistry that deal with
dangerous chemicals and strict safety protocols. It would likely be beneficial for the College of
Aviation leadership to work with the Provost to introduce the subject and explore whether
CASRS, modeled in its own way for other departments, could have value for the WMU Police
Department, the WMU Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine, or other departments.
Improvements to CASRS coding
The CASRS interface itself is not quite as user-friendly or bug-free as it could be. The
system contains a fair amount of broken links. For example, clicking on the tab called “CASRS
Wiki” at the bottom takes users to a page that no longer exists. Clicking on “management” and
then “analyze data” takes users to a page with five options; of the five, two links, “view all data
(de-identified)” and “data de-identified by causal factor/event type” are broken links. Clicking on
them simply takes users to a blank white page. Additionally, when viewing the results of a
criteria-based search, users are given a list of reports that matched the criteria. Clicking on the
hyperlink under “Report ID” simply takes users to a page which says, “no reports match your
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criteria.” As discussed already, several committee members have indicated that they voted in
agreement with each other, but the system failed to properly record their votes. The system is
maintained on a part-time, volunteer basis by a former employee. Nevertheless, it could certainly
be improved if a list of broken links or bugs was provided as a suggestion to be fixed. After all,
improvements to CASRS lead to overall improvements to safety.
Conclusion
SMS, the newest trend in aviation, is a four-pillar approach to safety management which
is considered by many to be the next step in improving aviation safety. NASA’s nationwide
ASRS program captures those four pillars, safety policy, safety risk management, safety
assurance, and safety promotion, in a single, confidential incident reporting program. That
program is aimed at making the aviation industry safer through self-reporting and risk
identification/mitigation. On a smaller, college wide-level, the College of Aviation’s CASRS
program matches ASRS’ application of the four SMS pillars, through a similar self-reporting
model. This tool has been proven to be greatly effective at incorporating SMS components while
reducing repeat safety incidents and identifying new risks facing the College of Aviation. There
is certainly room for improvement, but overall this system is doing an excellent job of fulfilling
the role for which it was intended.
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